美國加息節(jié)奏、力度觸動全球資本市場的敏感神經(jīng)，我國也受其影響。跟蹤美聯(lián)儲對加息行為的相關判斷，有利于我國提前采取措施面對國際金融環(huán)境變化帶來的影響，促進我國資本市場平穩(wěn)運行，避免出現(xiàn)重大波動，有效保護投資者，降低投資風險。

　　以下為美聯(lián)儲主席杰羅姆·鮑威爾（Jerome H. Powell）2018年11月28日晚，在紐約經(jīng)濟俱樂部的講話原文及譯文：

　　 

The Federal Reserve's Framework for Monitoring Financial Stability

　　美聯(lián)儲監(jiān)測金融穩(wěn)定的框架

　　                   

It is a pleasure to be back at the Economic Club of New York. I will begin by briefly reviewing the outlook for the economy, and then turn to a discussion of financial stability. My main subject today will be the profound transformation since the Global Financial Crisis in the Federal Reserve's approach to monitoring and addressing financial stability. Today marks the publication of the Board of Governors' firstFinancial Stability Report. Earlier this month, we published our first Supervision and Regulation Report. Together, these reports contain a wealth of information on our approach to financial stability and to financial regulation more broadly. By clearly and transparently explaining our policies, we aim to strengthen the foundation of democratic legitimacy that enables the Fed to serve the needs of the American public. 

　　很高興回到紐約經(jīng)濟俱樂部。 我將首先簡要回顧一下經(jīng)濟前景，然后再討論金融穩(wěn)定性。 今天我的主要議題將是全球金融危機以來美聯(lián)儲監(jiān)測和解決金融穩(wěn)定問題的方式發(fā)生的深刻轉變。 今天標志著理事會第一份金融穩(wěn)定報告的出版。 本月早些時候，我們發(fā)布了第一份監(jiān)督和監(jiān)管報告。 這些報告共同載有關于我們對金融穩(wěn)定和更廣泛的金融監(jiān)管方法的大量信息。 通過清晰透明地解釋我們的政策，我們的目標是加強民主合法性的基礎，使美聯(lián)儲能夠滿足美國公眾的需求。

　　 

Outlook and Monetary Policy

　　展望和貨幣政策

Congress assigned the Federal Reserve the job of promoting maximum employment and price stability. I am pleased to say that our economy is now close to both of those objectives. The unemployment rate is 3.7 percent, a 49-year low, and many other measures of labor market strength are at or near historic bests. Inflation is near our 2 percent target. The economy is growing at an annual rate of about 3 percent, well above most estimates of its longer-run trend. 

　　國會賦予美聯(lián)儲促進最大就業(yè)和價格穩(wěn)定的工作。 我很高興地說，我們的經(jīng)濟現(xiàn)在接近這兩個目標。當前美國 失業(yè)率為3.7％，為49年來的最低點，許多其他勞動力市場強弱指標均達到或接近歷史最高水平。 通貨膨脹接近我們2％的目標。 經(jīng)濟正以每年約3％的速度增長，遠高于其長期趨勢的大多數(shù)估計。

　　 

For seven years during the crisis and its painful aftermath, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) kept our policy interest rate unprecedentedly low--in fact, near zero--to support the economy as it struggled to recover. The health of the economy gradually but steadily improved, and about three years ago the FOMC judged that the interests of households and businesses, of savers and borrowers, were no longer best served by such extraordinarily low rates. We therefore began to raise our policy rate gradually toward levels that are more normal in a healthy economy. Interest rates are still low by historical standards, and they remain just below the broad range of estimates of the level that would be neutral for the economy？？that is, neither speeding up nor slowing down growth. My FOMC colleagues and I, as well as many private-sector economists, are forecasting continued solid growth, low unemployment, and inflation near 2 percent. 

　　在危機期間的七年及其痛苦的后果中，聯(lián)邦公開市場委員會（FOMC）將我們的政策利率維持在前所未有的低水平 - 實際上接近于零 - 以支持經(jīng)濟，當前經(jīng)濟正在努力恢復。 經(jīng)濟的健康狀況逐漸但穩(wěn)步提升，大約三年前，聯(lián)邦公開市場委員會認為家庭和企業(yè)，儲蓄者和借款人的利益不再是這種極低的利率最佳服務。 因此，我們開始逐步將政策利率提高到健康經(jīng)濟中更為正常的水平。 按歷史標準衡量，利率仍然很低，而且它們?nèi)匀坏陀趯?jīng)濟中性水平的廣泛估計范圍 - 即既不加速也不放緩增長。 我的FOMC同事和我以及許多私營經(jīng)濟學家預測，經(jīng)濟將持續(xù)穩(wěn)健增長，保持低失業(yè)率，通貨膨脹率接近2％。

　　 

There is a great deal to like about this outlook. But we know that things often turn out to be quite different from even the most careful forecasts. For this reason, sound policymaking is as much about managing risks as it is about responding to the baseline forecast. Our gradual pace of raising interest rates has been an exercise in balancing risks. We know that moving too fast would risk shortening the expansion. We also know that moving too slowly--keeping interest rates too low for too long--could risk other distortions in the form of higher inflation or destabilizing financial imbalances. Our path of gradual increases has been designed to balance these two risks, both of which we must take seriously.

　　關于這種觀點有很多值得關注的地方。但我們知道事情往往與最謹慎的預測完全不同。 出于這個原因，健全的政策制定與管理風險一樣，都與回應基線預測有關。 我們逐步加息的步伐一直是平衡風險的一種做法。 我們知道，移動太快會有縮短擴張的風險。 我們也知道，行動過于緩慢 - 將利率維持在太低的時間 - 可能會以通脹上升或不穩(wěn)定的金融失衡的形式面臨其他扭曲風險。 我們逐步增加的道路旨在平衡這兩種風險，我們必須認真對待這兩種風險。

　　 

We also know that the economic effects of our gradual rate increases are uncertain, and may take a year or more to be fully realized. While FOMC participants' projections are based on our best assessments of the outlook, there is no preset policy path. We will be paying very close attention to what incoming economic and financial data are telling us. As always, our decisions on monetary policy will be designed to keep the economy on track in light of the changing outlook for jobs and inflation. 

　　我們也知道，逐步加息的經(jīng)濟影響是不確定的，可能需要一年或更長時間才能完全實現(xiàn)。 雖然FOMC參與者的預測是基于我們對前景的最佳評估，但沒有預設的政策路徑。 我們將密切關注最新的經(jīng)濟和金融數(shù)據(jù)告訴我們的情況。 與往常一樣，我們的貨幣政策決策將旨在根據(jù)就業(yè)和通脹前景的變化保持經(jīng)濟走勢。

　　 

Under the dual mandate, jobs and inflation are the Fed's meat and potatoes. In the rest of my comments, I will focus on financial stability--a topic that has always been on the menu, but that, since the crisis, has become a more integral part of the meal. 

　　在雙重使命下，就業(yè)和通脹是美聯(lián)儲的肉和土豆。 在我的其他評論中，我將重點關注金融穩(wěn)定性 - 這個話題一直都在議題上，但是，自危機以來，這已成為這頓飯不可或缺的一部分。

　　 

Historical Perspective on Financial Stability

　　金融穩(wěn)定的歷史回顧

The term "financial stability" has a particular meaning in this context. A stable financial system is one that continues to function effectively even in severely adverse conditions. A stable system meets the borrowing and investment needs of households and businesses despite economic turbulence. An unstable system, in contrast, may amplify turbulence and prolong economic hardship in the face of stress by failing to provide these essential services when they are needed most. 

　　“金融穩(wěn)定”一詞在這方面具有特殊含義。 穩(wěn)定的金融體系即使在嚴峻的不利條件下也能繼續(xù)有效運作。 盡管經(jīng)濟動蕩，但穩(wěn)定的系統(tǒng)可滿足家庭和企業(yè)的借貸和投資需求。 相反，不穩(wěn)定的系統(tǒng)可能會在最需要時提供這些必要的服務，從而放大湍流，并在面臨壓力時延長經(jīng)濟困難。

　　 

For Economic Club of New York trivia buffs, I will note that the second ever presentation to this club by a Federal Reserve official was about this very topic. The date was March 18, 1929. Weeks before, the Fed had issued a public statement of concern over stock market speculation, and had provided guidance frowning on bank funding of such speculation. William Harding, a former Fed Chair and then president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, defended the Fed's actions in his talk. He argued that, while the Fed should not act as the arbiter of correct asset prices, it did have a primary responsibility to protect the banking system's capacity to meet the credit needs of households and businesses. At the meeting, critics argued that public statements about inflated asset prices were "fraught with danger;" that the nation's banks were so well managed that they should not "face public admonition"; and, more generally, that the Fed was "out of its sphere."1 Of course, Harding spoke just a few months before the 1929 stock market crash, which signaled the onset of the Great Depression.

　　對于紐約經(jīng)濟俱樂部的瑣事愛好者，我會注意到美聯(lián)儲官員第二次向這個俱樂部發(fā)表的演講是關于這個話題。這個日期是1929年3月18日。幾周之前，美聯(lián)儲發(fā)布了一份關于股市投機的公開聲明，并提供了對此類投機的銀行資金不屑一顧的指引。前美聯(lián)儲主席，波士頓聯(lián)邦儲備銀行行長威廉？哈丁（William Harding）為他的談話中的美聯(lián)儲行動辯護。他認為，雖然美聯(lián)儲不應該作為正確資產(chǎn)價格的仲裁者，但它確實負有保護銀行系統(tǒng)滿足家庭和企業(yè)信貸需求的能力的主要責任。在會議上，批評人士認為，有關虛增資產(chǎn)價格的公開聲明“充滿了危險”;這個國家的銀行管理得如此之好，以至于他們不應該“面對公眾的勸告”;而且更一般地說，美聯(lián)儲“走出了它的領域。”1當然，哈丁在1929年股市崩盤前幾個月發(fā)表講話，這標志著大蕭條的開始。

　　 

Fast forwarding, a host of Depression-era reforms helped avoid, for the next three-quarters of a century, a systemic financial crisis and the associated severe economic dislocation？？the longest such period in American history. Those decades saw many advances in monetary policy and in bank regulatory policy, but the appropriate role for government in managing threats to the broader financial system remained unresolved. Periodic bouts of financial stress during this period--such as the Latin American debt crisis, the savings and loan crisis, and the Russian debt default--were met with improvised responses. Policymakers conjured fixes from a mixture of private-sector rescues, emergency liquidity, occasional implicit or explicit bailouts, and monetary accommodation. Outside of these crisis responses, however, systemic issues were not a central focus of policy.

　　緊接著事情得到快速發(fā)展，一系列蕭條時期的改革有助于避免在接下來的四分之三個世紀內(nèi)出現(xiàn)系統(tǒng)性金融危機和相關的嚴重經(jīng)濟混亂 - 這是美國歷史上最長的時期。 幾十年來，貨幣政策和銀行監(jiān)管政策取得了許多進展，但政府在管理對更廣泛金融體系的威脅方面的適當作用仍未得到解決。 這一時期的金融壓力定期發(fā)生 - 例如拉丁美洲債務危機，儲蓄和貸款危機以及俄羅斯債務違約 - 都得到了即興的回應。 政策制定者從混合的私營部門救助，緊急流動性，偶爾的隱性或明確救助以及貨幣寬松等方面得到了修復。 然而，在這些危機應對之外，系統(tǒng)性問題不是政策的核心焦點。

　　 

The Global Financial Crisis demonstrated, in the clearest way, the limits of this approach. Highly inventive and courageous improvisation amid scenes of great drama helped avoid another Great Depression, but failed to prevent the most severe recession in 75 years. The crisis made clear that there can be no macroeconomic stability without financial stability, and that systemic stability risks often take root and blossom in good times.3 Thus, as the emergency phase of the crisis subsided, Congress, the Fed, and the other financial regulators began developing a fundamentally different approach to financial stability. Instead of relying on improvised responses after crises strike, policymakers now constantly monitor vulnerabilities and require firms to plan in advance for financial distress, in a framework that lays out solutions in advance during good times. 

　　全球金融危機以最清晰的方式證明了這種方法的局限性。 在戲劇性場面中極具創(chuàng)造性和勇敢的即興創(chuàng)作幫助避免了另一次大蕭條，但未能阻止75年來最嚴重的經(jīng)濟衰退。 危機清楚地表明，沒有金融穩(wěn)定就沒有宏觀經(jīng)濟穩(wěn)定，而且系統(tǒng)性穩(wěn)定風險往往在經(jīng)濟繁榮時期生根發(fā)芽.3因此，隨著危機的緊急階段平息，國會，美聯(lián)儲和其他金融危機 監(jiān)管機構開始制定一種根本不同的金融穩(wěn)定方法。 危機發(fā)生后，政策制定者不再依賴即興應對措施，而是不斷監(jiān)測脆弱性，并要求企業(yè)提前計劃財務困境，并在經(jīng)濟繁榮時期提前提出解決方案。

　　 

The New Approach to Financial Stability

　　實現(xiàn)金融穩(wěn)定的新途徑

This new approach can be divided into three parts. First, build up the strength and resilience of the financial system. Second, develop and apply a broad framework for monitoring financial stability on an ongoing basis. And third, explain the new approach as transparently as possible, so that the public and its representatives in Congress can provide oversight and hold us accountable for this work. Although I'll focus mainly on the stability efforts of the Federal Reserve, a number of federal regulatory agencies have responsibilities in this area. All of these agencies are represented on the Financial Stability Oversight Council, or FSOC, which is chaired by the Treasury Secretary and which provides a forum for interagency cooperation in responding to emerging risks. 

　　這種新途徑（方法）可分為三個部分。 首先，增強金融體系的實力和彈性。 第二，制定并應用廣泛的框架，持續(xù)監(jiān)測金融穩(wěn)定性。 第三，盡可能透明地解釋新方法，以便公眾及其在國會的代表能夠提供監(jiān)督并讓我們對這項工作負責。 雖然我將主要關注美聯(lián)儲的穩(wěn)定性努力，但一些聯(lián)邦監(jiān)管機構在這方面負有責任。 所有這些機構都在金融穩(wěn)定監(jiān)督委員會（FSOC）中有代表，該委員會由財政部長擔任主席，并為應對新出現(xiàn)的風險提供機構間合作的論壇。

　　 

Building Resilience of the Financial System 

　　建立金融體系的彈性

After 10 years of concentrated effort in the public and private sectors, the system is now much stronger, with greater capacity to function effectively in stressful times. In the banking system, we have implemented a post-crisis regulatory framework based on robust capital and liquidity requirements, a strong stress-testing regime, and mandatory living wills for the largest firms. As a result, banks now have much more high quality capital than before. The most recent stress tests indicate that, even after a severe global recession, capital levels at the largest banks would remain above regulatory minimums, and above the levels those banks held in good times before the crisis.4 The most systemically important financial institutions also now hold roughly 20 percent of their assets in the form of high quality liquid assets--that is, safe assets that could be readily sold at short notice. The share of these assets is about four times its pre-crisis level. 

　　經(jīng)過公共和私營部門10年的集中努力，該系統(tǒng)現(xiàn)在變得更加強大，在壓力時期有更大的有效運作能力。 在銀行系統(tǒng)中，我們實施了基于強大的資本和流動性要求的危機后監(jiān)管框架，強大的壓力測試制度以及最大公司的強制性生前遺囑。 因此，銀行現(xiàn)在擁有比以前更高質量的資本。 最近的壓力測試表明，即使在嚴重的全球經(jīng)濟衰退之后，最大銀行的資本水平仍將高于監(jiān)管最低標準，并高于銀行在危機前的良好時期所持有的水平.4現(xiàn)在最具系統(tǒng)重要性的金融機構 以高質量流動資產(chǎn)的形式持有大約20％的資產(chǎn) - 也就是說，可以在短時間內(nèi)隨時出售的安全資產(chǎn)。 這些資產(chǎn)的份額大約是危機前水平的四倍。

　　 

Compared with other economies, lending and borrowing in the United States depend less on bank loans and more on funds flowing through a wide array of capital market channels. The crisis revealed that this capital market centric system, despite its many benefits, also provides more places where systemic risks can emerge. In response, Congress and the regulatory agencies have made many stability-enhancing changes outside of the banking system. For example, many derivatives transactions are now required to be centrally cleared, which, through netting, has reduced exposures and enabled better management of counterparty risk. Tri-party repurchase agreement (repo) reforms have substantially improved the resilience of that marketplace, in particular by limiting intraday loans. Before the crisis, prime institutional money market funds were permitted to report a constant, $1 share price so long as the value of the underlying assets remained near $1. This reporting convention, combined with the implicit support of the plans' sponsors, led investors to treat those funds like bank deposits, even though they were not likewise insured. These funds are now required to report floating net-asset values, and after this reform investors chose to migrate to government-only funds, which are safer and less susceptible to runs .These and other measures have reduced the risk that key non-bank parts of the system would freeze up in the face of market stress.

　　與其他經(jīng)濟體相比，美國的貸款和借款較少依賴銀行貸款，而更多依賴于流經(jīng)各種資本市場渠道的資金。危機表明，這個以資本市場為中心的體系雖然有很多好處，但也提供了更多可能出現(xiàn)系統(tǒng)性風險的地方。作為回應，國會和監(jiān)管機構在銀行系統(tǒng)之外進行了許多穩(wěn)定性增強的變革。例如，現(xiàn)在需要集中清算許多衍生品交易，這些交易通過凈額結算減少了風險敞口，并能夠更好地管理交易對手風險。三方回購協(xié)議（回購）改革大大提高了該市場的彈性，特別是通過限制日內(nèi)貸款。危機前，只要相關資產(chǎn)的價值保持在1美元附近，主要機構貨幣市場基金就可以報告恒定的1美元股票價格。該報告慣例，加上計劃贊助商的暗示支持，導致投資者將這些資金視為銀行存款，即使他們沒有同樣投保。這些資金現(xiàn)在需要報告浮動凈資產(chǎn)價值，在這次改革之后，投資者選擇遷移到政府專用基金，這些基金更安全，更不易受到影響.這些和其他措施一起共同降低了風險面對市場壓力，該系統(tǒng)的主要非銀行部分將凍結。

　　 

A New Framework for Monitoring Systemic Risks

　　系統(tǒng)風險監(jiān)控的新框架

Innovation and risk-taking contribute to the dynamism of our financial system and our economy. As Hyman Minsky emphasized, along with the many benefits of dynamism comes the reality that the financial system will sometimes evolve toward excess and dangerous imbalances.This reality underscores the vital importance of the second part of post-crisis reform: monitoring for emerging vulnerabilities. 

　　創(chuàng)新和風險承擔有助于我們的金融體系和經(jīng)濟的活力。 正如海曼明斯基所強調的那樣，伴隨著動力的諸多好處，金融系統(tǒng)有時會演變?yōu)檫^度和危險的不平衡.這一現(xiàn)實強調了危機后改革第二部分的重要性：監(jiān)測新出現(xiàn)的脆弱性。

　　 

As laid out in our new Financial Stability Report, we have developed a framework to help us monitor risks to stability in our complex and rapidly evolving financial system. The framework distinguishes between shocks, that is, trigger events that can be hard to predict or influence, and vulnerabilities, defined as features of the financial system that amplify shocks. The report is organized around four broad vulnerabilities that have been prominent in financial crises through the centuries. Each of these vulnerabilities is often found to some degree even in healthy market-based systems, and there is not, at present, any generally accepted standard for assessing at what level the vulnerabilities begin to pose serious stability risks. In lieu of such a standard, we flag cases in which the vulnerabilities rise well beyond historical norms, and then form judgments about the stability risks those cases present. 

　　正如我們新的“金融穩(wěn)定報告”所述，我們已經(jīng)制定了一個框架，幫助我們監(jiān)控復雜且快速發(fā)展的金融體系中的穩(wěn)定風險。 該框架區(qū)分了沖擊，即可能難以預測或影響的觸發(fā)事件，以及被定義為放大沖擊的金融系統(tǒng)特征的漏洞。 該報告圍繞四個廣泛的脆弱性進行組織，這些脆弱性在幾個世紀以來一直在金融危機中占據(jù)突出地位。即使在健康的基于市場的系統(tǒng)中，這些漏洞中的每一個通常都會在某種程度上被發(fā)現(xiàn)，并且目前還沒有任何普遍接受的標準來評估漏洞在何種程度上開始構成嚴重的穩(wěn)定性風險。 代替這樣的標準，我們識別出哪些漏洞遠遠超出歷史規(guī)范的案例，然后對這些案例中存在的穩(wěn)定性風險做出判斷。

　　 

The first vulnerability is excessive leverage in the financial sector. If a highly leveraged segment of the financial system is buffeted by adverse events, the affected entities may all need to deleverage at the same time by selling assets, leading to what is called a "fire sale." Both the resulting decline in asset prices and the impaired ability of the segment to play its role in the economy can amplify the effects of a downturn. We saw this chain of events play out repeatedly in various parts of the financial sector in the weeks following the failure of Lehman Brothers in 2008. 

　　第一個漏洞是金融部門的過度杠桿.如果金融體系的高杠桿部分受到不利事件的沖擊，受影響的實體可能都需要通過出售資產(chǎn)同時去杠桿化，從而導致所謂的“ 甩賣。” 由此導致的資產(chǎn)價格下跌以及該部門在經(jīng)濟中發(fā)揮作用的能力受損都會加劇經(jīng)濟衰退的影響。 在雷曼兄弟2008年失敗后的幾周內(nèi)，我們看到這一系列事件在金融部門的各個部門反復出現(xiàn)。

　　 

In our surveillance, we examine leverage across many types of financial institutions, including banks, insurance companies, hedge funds, and various funding vehicles. Currently, we do not detect a broad-based buildup of abnormal or excessive leverage. As with banks, capital levels at insurance companies and broker-dealers appear robust. In addition, securitization levels are far below their pre-crisis levels, and those structures that do exist rely on more stable funding. Our view into leverage and risk-taking outside the banking sector is admittedly incomplete, however, and we are always working to get a better view of emerging leverage excesses.

　　 在我們的監(jiān)督中，我們檢查了許多類型金融機構的杠桿率，包括銀行，保險公司，對沖基金和各種融資工具。 目前，我們沒有發(fā)現(xiàn)基于廣泛的異常或過度杠桿積累。 與銀行一樣，保險公司和經(jīng)紀自營商的資本水平看似強勁。 此外，證券化水平遠低于危機前的水平，而那些確實存在的結構依賴于更穩(wěn)定的資金。 然而，我們對銀行業(yè)以外的杠桿和風險承擔的看法是不完整的，我們一直在努力更好地了解新興的杠桿率過剩.

　　 

The second vulnerability is funding risk, which arises when banks or nonbank financial entities rely on funding that can be rapidly withdrawn. If depositors or market participants lose faith in the soundness of an institution or the system as a whole, unstable funding can simply vanish in what is called a "run." During the crisis, we saw widespread runs, including at broker-dealers, some segments of the repo market, and money market mutual funds. These runs did severe damage, contributing to a generalized panic at the time. Had the authorities not stepped in, the damage could have been even more severe. 

　　第二個漏洞是融資風險，當銀行或非銀行金融實體依賴可以迅速撤回的資金時就會產(chǎn)生融資風險。 如果存款人或市場參與者對一個機構或整個系統(tǒng)的穩(wěn)健性失去信心，那么不穩(wěn)定的資金就會在所謂的“競選”中消失。 在危機期間，我們看到了廣泛的運行，包括經(jīng)紀自營商，回購市場的一些部分以及貨幣市場共同基金。 這些運行造成嚴重損害，導致當時的普遍恐慌。 如果當局沒有介入，損害可能會更加嚴重。

　　 

Today we view funding-risk vulnerabilities as low. Banks hold low levels of liabilities that are able and likely to run, and they hold high levels of liquid assets to fund any outflows that do occur. Money market mutual fund reforms have greatly reduced the run risk in that sector. More generally, it is short-term, uninsured funding that would be most likely to run in a future stress event, and the volume of such funding is now significantly below pre-crisis peaks. 

　　今天，我們認為融資風險漏洞很低。 銀行持有能夠和可能運行的低負債水平，并持有高水平的流動資產(chǎn)，以資助任何確實發(fā)生的資金流出。 貨幣市場共同基金改革大大降低了該部門的經(jīng)營風險。 更一般地說，它是短期的，沒有保險的資金，最有可能在未來的壓力事件中運行，而且這種資金的數(shù)量現(xiàn)在大大低于危機前的峰值。

　　 

Taken together, the evidence on these first two vulnerabilities strongly supports the view that financial institutions and markets are substantially more resilient than they were before the crisis. Indeed, the American financial system has successfully weathered some periods of significant stress over the past several years.

　　簡而言之，前兩個漏洞的證據(jù)強烈支持金融機構和市場比危機前更具彈性的觀點。實際上，美國金融體系在過去幾年中已成功度過了一些重大壓力期。

　　 

The third vulnerability is excessive debt loads at households and businesses. Credit booms have often led to credit busts and sometimes to painful economic downturns. When the bust comes, those who have overborrowed tend to sharply reduce their spending. Defaults typically rise faster than had been expected, which may put financial institutions into distress. These effects may combine to bring a serious economic downturn. 

　　第三個漏洞是家庭和企業(yè)的過度債務負擔。 信貸繁榮經(jīng)常導致信貸危機，有時甚至導致經(jīng)濟下滑。 當蕭條來臨時，那些過度借貸的人傾向于大幅減少開支。 違約率通常上升速度超過預期，這可能使金融機構陷入困境。 這些影響可能會帶來嚴重的經(jīng)濟衰退。

　　 

This boom-bust pattern was clear in measures of household debt around the crisis period, with mortgage debt rising far above its historical trend and then contracting sharply (see figure 5). After the contraction, household debt has grown only moderately. The net increase in mortgage debt has been among borrowers with higher credit scores. While heavily indebted households always suffer in a downturn, all of this suggests that household debt would not present a systemic stability threat if the economy sours. 

　　在危機時期的家庭債務衡量指標中，這種繁榮 - 蕭條模式是明確的，抵押貸款債務遠遠高于其歷史趨勢，然后急劇收縮。 收縮后，家庭債務只是適度增長。抵押貸款債務的凈增長一直是來自那些信用評分較高的借款人。雖然負債累累的家庭總是處于低迷狀態(tài)，但所有這些都表明，如果經(jīng)濟惡化，家庭債務不會構成系統(tǒng)性穩(wěn)定性威脅。

　　 

Nonfinancial business borrowing presents a subtler story. With corporate debt, the United States has not faced a massive credit boom like that experienced with residential mortgages before the recent crisis. Instead, after controlling for its trend, business borrowing relative GDP has risen during expansions, no doubt reflecting business optimism, and then fallen when the cycle turned, as some of that optimism proved unfounded. By this measure, the ratio of corporate debt to GDP is about where one might expect after nearly a decade of economic expansion: it is well above its trend, but not yet at the peaks hit in the late 1980s or late 1990s. Further, the upward trend in recent years appears broadly consistent with the growth in business assets relative to GDP. 

　　非金融業(yè)務借貸呈現(xiàn)出一個更微妙的故事。 在公司債務方面，美國并未面臨像最近危機前住宅抵押貸款那樣的大規(guī)模信貸繁榮。 相反，在控制其趨勢之后，商業(yè)借貸相對GDP在擴張期間上升，無疑反映了商業(yè)樂觀情緒，然后在周期轉變時下降，因為一些樂觀情緒證明是沒有根據(jù)的。 通過這一衡量標準，公司債務與GDP的比率大約是經(jīng)過近十年經(jīng)濟擴張后人們可能預期的水平：它遠高于其趨勢，但尚未達到20世紀80年代末或90年代末的峰值。 此外，近年來的上升趨勢似乎與企業(yè)資產(chǎn)相對于GDP的增長大體一致。

　　 

There are reasons for concern, however. Information on individual firms reveals that, over the past year, firms with high leverage and interest burdens have been increasing their debt loads the most. In addition, other measures of underwriting quality have deteriorated, and leverage multiples have moved up. Some of these highly leveraged borrowers would surely face distress if the economy turned down, leading investors to take higher-than-expected losses--developments that could exacerbate the downturn. The question for financial stability is whether elevated business bankruptcies and outsized losses would risk undermining the ability of the financial system to perform its critical functions on behalf of households and businesses. For now, my view is that such losses are unlikely to pose a threat to the safety and soundness of the institutions at the core of the system and, instead, are likely to fall on investors in vehicles like collateralized loan obligations with stable funding that present little threat of damaging fire sales. Of course, we will continue to monitor developments in this sector carefully.

　　 然而，有理由擔心。有關個別公司的信息顯示，在過去一年中，具有高杠桿率和利息負擔的公司一直在增加其債務負擔。此外，其他承保質量指標已經(jīng)惡化，杠桿倍數(shù)上升。如果經(jīng)濟下滑，這些高杠桿借款人中的一些肯定會面臨困境，導致投資者承受高于預期的損失 - 這些發(fā)展可能會加劇經(jīng)濟衰退。金融穩(wěn)定性的問題在于，高企業(yè)破產(chǎn)和超額虧損是否有可能破壞金融系統(tǒng)代表家庭和企業(yè)履行其關鍵職能的能力。就目前而言，我認為這種損失不大可能對系統(tǒng)核心機構的安全性和穩(wěn)健性構成威脅，也不會對有穩(wěn)定資金來源的擔保貸款債務的投資者構成威脅。10 當然，我們會繼續(xù)仔細監(jiān)察這個行業(yè)的發(fā)展。

　　 

The fourth and final vulnerability arises when asset values rise far above conventional, historically observed valuation benchmarks--a phenomenon popularly referred to as a "bubble." The contentious term "bubble" does not appear in our work, however.11 Instead, we focus is on the extent to which an asset's price is high or low relative to conventional benchmarks based on expected payoffs and current economic conditions. Historically, when asset prices soar far above standard benchmarks, sharp declines follow with some regularity, and those declines may bring economic misery reaching far beyond investors directly involved in the speculative boom. We therefore pay close attention when valuations get to the extreme ends of what we have seen in history. 

　　當資產(chǎn)價值遠高于傳統(tǒng)的，歷史上觀察到的估值基準時出現(xiàn)第四個也是最后一個脆弱性 - 這種現(xiàn)象通常被稱為“泡沫”。 然而，有爭議的術語“泡沫”并未出現(xiàn)在我們的工作中.11相反，我們關注的是資產(chǎn)價格相對于基于預期收益和當前經(jīng)濟狀況的傳統(tǒng)基準的高或低程度。 從歷史上看，當資產(chǎn)價格飆升至遠高于標準基準時，大幅下跌伴隨著一些規(guī)律性，而這些下跌可能會帶來經(jīng)濟上的痛苦，遠遠超出直接參與投機熱潮的投資者。 因此，當估值達到我們歷史所見的極端時，我們會密切關注。

　　 

Looking across the landscape of major asset classes, we see some classes for which valuations seem high relative to history. For example, even after standard adjustments for economic conditions, valuations on riskier forms of corporate debt and commercial properties are in the upper ends of their post-crisis distributions, although they are short of the levels they hit in the pre-crisis credit boom. We see no major asset class, however, where valuations appear far in excess of standard benchmarks as some did, for example, in the late 1990s dot-com boom or the pre-crisis credit boom. 

　　縱觀主要資產(chǎn)類別的情況，我們看到一些估值與歷史相關的類別。例如，即使在對經(jīng)濟狀況進行標準調整之后，風險較高的公司債務和商業(yè)地產(chǎn)的估值也處于其危機后分布的上限，盡管它們沒有達到危機前信貸繁榮時期的水平。 然而，我們認為沒有重要的資產(chǎn)類別，其估值似乎遠遠超過標準基準，例如，在20世紀90年代末的網(wǎng)絡繁榮或危機前的信貸繁榮時期。

　　 

The asset class that gets the most attention day-to-day is, of course, the stock market. Today, equity market prices are broadly consistent with historical benchmarks such as forward price-to-earnings ratios. It is important to distinguish between market volatility and events that threaten financial stability. Large, sustained declines in equity prices can put downward pressure on spending and confidence. From the financial stability perspective, however, today we do not see dangerous excesses in the stock market. 

　　當然，日常受關注的資產(chǎn)類別是股票市場。 今天，股票市場價格與遠期市盈率等歷史基準大體一致。 區(qū)分市場波動和威脅金融穩(wěn)定的事件非常重要。 股票價格大幅持續(xù)下跌可能會給支出和信心帶來下行壓力。 然而，從金融穩(wěn)定的角度來看，今天我們看不到股市的過度危險。

　　 

Monitoring Likely Triggers for Financial Distress 

　　監(jiān)控金融危機的可能觸發(fā)因素

I mentioned the distinction between vulnerabilities and shocks, or triggers. In addition to monitoring vulnerabilities under our four-part framework, we also consult a broad range of contacts regarding sources of risk that might trigger distress at any given time. For example, discussions with contacts currently point to risks emanating from the normalization of monetary policy in the United States and elsewhere, the unsettled state of trade negotiations, Brexit negotiations, budget discussions between Italy and the European Union, and cyber-related disruptions.

　　我提到了漏洞和沖擊或觸發(fā)因素之間的區(qū)別。 除了監(jiān)控我們的四部分框架下的漏洞之外，我們還咨詢了有關風險來源的廣泛聯(lián)系，這些風險可能在任何特定時間引發(fā)危機。 例如，美國和其他地方貨幣政策正常化所帶來的風險，貿(mào)易談判未解決的狀況，英國脫歐談判，意大利與歐盟之間的預算討論以及與網(wǎng)絡有關的破壞。

　　 

Having identified possible triggers, we can assess how a particular trigger is likely to interact with known vulnerabilities. A good current example is that of Brexit. U.S. banks and broker-dealers participate in some of the markets most likely to be affected by Brexit. The Fed and other regulators have been working with U.S. financial institutions that have operations in the European Union or the United Kingdom to prepare for the full range of possible outcomes to the negotiations. In addition, the scenarios used in the stress tests routinely feature severe global contractions and show that U.S. banks have the capital to weather even highly disruptive events.

　　 確定了金融危機可能的觸發(fā)因素后，我們可以評估特定觸發(fā)因素如何與已知漏洞進行交互發(fā)生作用。 目前最好的例子是英國退歐。 美國的銀行和經(jīng)紀自營商參與了一些最有可能受英國退歐影響的市場。 美聯(lián)儲和其他監(jiān)管機構一直在與在歐盟或英國開展業(yè)務的美國金融機構合作，為談判的各種可能結果做好準備。 此外，壓力測試中使用的情景通常以嚴重的全球收縮為特征，并表明美國銀行有資金來應對高度破壞性的事件。

　　 

Bottom Line: Financial Stability Risks Are Moderate 

　　底線：金融穩(wěn)定風險適中

I have reviewed a few of the key facts that inform our thinking about financial stability, and you will find a great deal more detail in our new report. You will also find that the report does not come to a bottom line conclusion. As I noted earlier, we have limited experience with this monitoring, and there is no widely accepted basis for reaching a bottom line. Thus, the purpose of the report is to provide a common platform and set of readings from which policymakers and other interested parties can form their own views. Individual policymakers will sometimes differ in their assessments and on the relative weight they put on particular vulnerabilities. My own assessment is that, while risks are above normal in some areas and below normal in others, overall financial stability vulnerabilities are at a moderate level.

　　 

In my view, the most important feature of the stability landscape is the strength of the financial system. The risks of destabilizing runs are far lower than in the past. The institutions at the heart of the financial system are more resilient. The stress tests routinely feature extremely severe downturns in business credit, and the largest banks have the capital and liquidity to continue to function under such circumstances. Because this core resilience is so important, we are committed to preserving and strengthening the key improvements since the crisis, particularly those in capital, liquidity, stress testing, and resolution. 

　　我已經(jīng)回顧了一些關于金融穩(wěn)定性的關鍵事實，你會在我們的新報告中找到更多細節(jié)。您還會發(fā)現(xiàn)報告沒有得出底線結論。 正如我前面提到的，我們對這種監(jiān)測的經(jīng)驗有限，并沒有廣泛接受的基礎來達到底線。 因此，報告的目的是提供一個共同的平臺和一套閱讀材料，政策制定者和其他相關方可以從中形成自己的觀點。 個別政策制定者有時會在評估和他們對特定脆弱性的相對權重方面有所不同。我自己的評估是，雖然某些地區(qū)的風險高于正常水平，而其他地區(qū)的風險低于正常水平，但整體金融穩(wěn)定性脆弱性處于中等水平。

　　在我看來，穩(wěn)定性格局最重要的特征是金融體系的優(yōu)勢。 破壞穩(wěn)定的風險遠低于過去。 金融體系核心的機構更具彈性。 壓力測試通常會導致商業(yè)信貸嚴重下滑，大銀行在這種情況下有資本和流動性繼續(xù)發(fā)揮作用。 由于這種核心彈性如此重要，我們致力于保護和加強自危機以來的關鍵改進，特別是資本，流動性，壓力測試和解決方案。

　　 

Conclusion

　　結論

I'd like to conclude by putting financial stability and our two new reports in a longer-term context. To paraphrase a famous line, "eternal vigilance is the price of financial stability." We will publish these reports regularly as part of our vigilance. Over time, some may be tempted to dismiss the reports entirely or to overdramatize any concerns they raise. Instead, these reports should be viewed as you might view the results of a regular health checkup. We all hope for a report that is not very exciting. Many baby boomers like me are, however, reaching an age where a good report is, "Well, there are a number of things we should keep an eye on, but all things considered you are in good health." That is how I view the Financial Stability Report out today. We hope that this report and the Supervision and Regulation Report will be important tools, sharing Federal Reserve views and stimulating public dialogue regarding the stability of the financial system. 

　　 

　　最后，我想將金融穩(wěn)定性和我們的兩份新報告置于更長遠的背景下。 用一句名言來解釋，“永恒的警惕是金融穩(wěn)定的代價”。 我們將定期發(fā)布這些報告，作為我們警惕的一部分。 隨著時間的推移，有些人可能會試圖完全反駁這些報告，或者過度夸大他們提出的任何問題。 相反，應該查看這些報告，因為您可能會查看常規(guī)健康檢查的結果。 我們都希望報告不是很令人興奮。 然而，像我這樣的許多嬰兒潮一代正在達到一個好報告的年齡，“好吧，我們應該關注一些事情，但所有事情都表明你身體健康。” 這就是我今天看待金融穩(wěn)定報告的方式。我們希望本報告和監(jiān)管規(guī)范報告將成為重要工具，有助于分享美聯(lián)儲的觀點，促進有關金融體系穩(wěn)定性的公眾對話。